Kenya’s 2013 election: Lessons for democracy promotion Gabrielle Lynch, Nic Cheeseman and Justin Willis On 4 March 2013, Kenya held general elections for six levels of government office, under a new constitution adopted in 2010. The elections were largely peaceful, and produced a presidential result that was ultimately accepted by losing parties. Given the controversy, instability and violence that followed the flawed polls of December 2007, and the scale of the challenge posed by the 2013 elections – six simultaneous ballots in a single day, across a large and diverse country – this was no mean feat. However, while the elections were peaceful, the electoral process broke down in multiple ways. As a result, the principal opposition alliance appealed against the result and continues to insist that the polls were not fully free and fair, although they accepted a Supreme Court decision that upheld the presidential result. More worryingly, a significant number of Kenyans – largely concentrated in the historically marginalised areas of the country and opposition strongholds – do not believe that the election was free and fair and have lost faith in key public institutions. The election thus offers a contradictory picture, and it is unclear whether, in the long run, it will have furthered the consolidation of democracy. Given the range of institutional and social programmes supported by the international community and local civil society between 2008 and 2013 – from the implementation of a new constitution and establishment of a new electoral commission to inter-community dialogue sessions and peace campaigns – this mixed legacy offers important lessons for those involved in democracy promotion. This briefing highlights some of the lessons that can be drawn in the areas of institutional reform, the promotion of democratic norms, peace and justice, and technologies and their implementation. But first, one needs to set these lessons in context. Kenya’s 2013 election and the fear of violence Kenya’s 2007 elections were followed by widespread violence, triggered by accusations that Mwai Kibaki’s presidential poll victory over Raila Odinga was the result of malpractice. Over 1,000 people died, and 700,000 more were displaced. The violence was shocking in its scale and intensity, in the high levels of inter-communal animosity it Commonwealth Governance 22 Handbook 2013/14 revealed, and the apparent ease with which a seemingly peaceful country was brought to the brink of civil conflict. The general consensus was that, while the crisis was triggered by an electoral dispute, it was fuelled by deepseated problems including: a culture of impunity; the loss of the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force; a winner-takes-all political logic; ethnically-delineated narratives of marginalisation and historical injustice; high youth unemployment; and social and spatial inequalities. It was widely acknowledged that these intractable problems had not been sufficiently addressed by the time of the 2013 elections. Together with previous episodes of electionrelated violence in 1992 and 1997, the experience of 2007/8 led many commentators to fear that the polls and, more specifically, the announcement of the results, could trigger further violence in 2013. Ultimately, however, the 2013 election proved relatively peaceful. This was despite controversy over the electoral register and the failure of new technology; an extremely close presidential election in which Uhuru Kenyatta of the Jubilee Alliance won a surprise first round victory by just 8,418 votes; and the initial rejection of the result by his principal opponent, Raila Odinga of the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD). Rather than call his supporters out onto the street, as he did in 2007, Odinga brought an electoral petition before the new Supreme Court and then accepted the court’s validation of the official results. One of the questions that the election raises is thus: why, despite questionable credibility, were results ultimately accepted, and what does this mean for the efficacy of democracy support efforts and the future of Kenya’s democracy? Political institutions, political culture and the reform agenda The post-election crisis of 2007/8 prompted an ambitious programme of institutional reform. Most notable was the inauguration of a new constitution in 2010, which, among other things, sought to decrease the powers of the President, devolve power to new county governments and formally establish a broad range of human and socioeconomic rights. Partly as a result of this new constitution, a number of key institutions were reformed including the
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