E f f e c t i v e a n d a c c o u n t a b l e s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y accountability mechanisms, and, consequently, may have a negative impact on the ability – or willingness – of agents to deliver effective services to citizens. In addition to differences in the nature of democratic actors, a myriad of institutional arrangements and democratic arenas can have a direct impact on the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms. One analytical distinction to consider is the difference between vertical and horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability mechanisms refer to the relationships between citizens conceived as principals (voters, organised society and the media) and state agents who have an effective expectation to answer for their actions (legislatures, elected representatives, the executive branch and local government). Figure 1 is a simplified map of vertical and horizontal accountability relationships in the case of presidential systems. The purpose of institutions of horizontal accountability is to ensure that no government agency encroaches on the rights of another government body and that no government office stands above the rule of law (O’Donnell, 1998). The strength and effectiveness of these institutions depend on their origin and level of autonomy vis-à-vis other branches of the state. In a context in which oversight institutions are directly or indirectly dependent on the executive branch (e.g. if they are appointed by the president or directly financed by the president’s office), it is likely that they will be less proactive in holding governments to account. Political parties Political parties – and elected representatives – play a dual role in the accountability landscape, since they can be both democratic instruments to hold governments to account (account-holders) and also agents of accountability that respond to the demands of their voters through the electoral cycle (account-givers). There is some academic agreement that more policy-oriented political parties are instrumentally more effective at demanding and providing accountability than parties structured along personalistic or clientelistic lines. There is less scholarly consensus on the impact of the number of political parties on accountability relationships. Electoral systems The nature and design of electoral systems have a significant impact on enhancing or undermining the prospects for democratic accountability in a given context. For example, systems that promote some kind of proportional representation (PR) of different interests may enable greater participation by citizens in the decisionmaking process, and thus facilitate the proliferation of people who demand accountability. At the same time, however, such systems will undermine the identifiability of the agents that are to be held to account if, for example, the responsibility for actions taken or not taken is distributed among the multiple representatives who were elected in the same district (Morgenstern, 2004). Recent research has illustrated that the choice of different candidate nomination rules has a significant impact on who legislative agents are likely to be accountable to, not just between voters and elected politicians, but also among elected politicians themselves. Parliaments and legislatures A country’s legislature has considerable potential to be a body that provides and demands effective accountability. There are rules and institutions, in addition to the electoral and partisan configurations discussed above, which facilitate democratic accountability. A first dimension to consider is whether the leader of the government has been directly elected by the people, as in a presidential system, or elected by members of the parliament. In the latter case, the government’s survival depends on gathering sufficient partisan support through a vote of confidence, whereas presidents have a more independent relationship vis-à-vis the legislature. In addition to this division of power, there is an important division of purpose that is determined by the amount of political support that the government has in parliament. A parliament’s ability to hold governments to account will also depend on the political effectiveness of legislative committees and committee hearing procedures. This is directly related to the technical capacity of the legislature to archive, analyse and process information, the transparency and level of institutionalisation of legislative procedures, and the extent to which legislative committees are staffed with experienced and professional politicians. Legislative committees also offer a valuable entry point to facilitate the participation of civil society in the decision-making and oversight processes. Control and oversight – beyond institutions? In addition to formally constituted and legally recognised arenas, there has been a recent proliferation of political spaces (‘civil society space’) in which citizens can voice their concerns and demand accountability from elected officials. As we found in the empirical review, in some cases these alternative mechanisms have also provided legal sanctions to compel politicians to act in a responsive manner. An alternative approach to understanding political accountability focuses on the social dynamics that can improve accountability relationships between voters and government officials through the provision of goods and services. Unlike political accountability mechanisms, these types of social accountability (SA) mechanisms are not limited to specific formal procedures (elections) or regular intervals (electoral cycles), but instead facilitate the continuous reflection of citizens’ demands. Through SA mechanisms, citizens have organised to demand service Commonwealth Governance Handbook 2013/14 56
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