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CEP template 2012

R i s k , t r a n s p a r e n c y a n d s e c u r i t y Ministries in September 2013 called for the provision of assistance to developing countries on their cybercrime issues’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2011). This unifies the two strands of the Commonwealth’s mandate. Not only will the Commonwealth provide general assistance to member states in relation to cybercrime, but it will also continue to develop the Commonwealth Cybercrime Initiative, which is now convened by the Commonwealth Secretariat. The Commonwealth Cybercrime Initiative There is a plethora of support offered to countries seeking to combat cybercrime. This presents a significant risk in itself, primarily in the form of duplicated interventions resulting in the squandering of limited resources. The Third Principle of the Paris Declaration of Aid Efficiency, harmonisation, aims to prevent such mistakes and commits donor countries, including many members of the Commonwealth, to ‘work together to reduce the number of separate, duplicative, missions to the field and diagnostic reviews; and promote joint training to share lessons learnt and build a community of practice’ (OECD, 2005: p. 6). The Commonwealth has uniquely embraced this requirement by developing the Commonwealth Cybercrime Initiative (CCI). The CCI represents a unique attempt to crystallise this commitment to efficacy and collaboration in cybercrime capacity-building. The programme unites 35 international organisations possessing expertise, mandates and resources, including Interpol, OAS, CoE, CTO and ITU, to contribute to multidisciplinary programmes in Commonwealth countries. These organisations form the CCI Consortium. Upon receipt of a request from a member state, the CCI deploys a mission team including at least one technical and one criminal justice expert, drawn from the consortium members best placed to donate these resources. A gap analysis is then conducted using a specialised CCI checklist (a tool agreed to by all partners) from which a needs assessment report is produced. The outcomes of this report are agreed with the member state, which outlines its priorities and capacities for reform. The consortium is asked to make commitments to meeting these needs, which then form a plan of action for the member state. A strong example of such an approach is in Ghana, where, following a needs assessment in 2013 and under the CCI umbrella, the CTO has embarked on an awareness raising scheme, the Secretariat has begun a review of relevant legislation, the ITU has developed a national Child Online Protection initiative and the UK’s Open University has begun collaboration on two academic centres of excellence at two Ghanaian universities. This is a unique solution to the problem of scarce resourcing and provides a multitude of routes to assistance. It is predicated on the unique relationship between the Commonwealth, its member states and the international community. This represents a potential model for future multi-stakeholder engagements. Conclusion Cybercrime is an evolving area of policy where criminal elements are able, through technological and networking advantage, to far outpace legal frameworks. As such, there has been an explosive growth in both the volume and practices of cybercrime. Difficulties in securing international agreement on governance have resulted in policy fragmentation. Alongside this there is a diversity of support available to states – yet paradoxically limited funding for such work. The exposure of Commonwealth members, together with the Commonwealth’s inherent advantages, has generated bespoke responses to the cybercrime challenge. Through both direct, bilateral assistance to member states and the innovative CCI programme, pragmatic attempts to deal with cybercrime are being promulgated throughout the Commonwealth. Commonwealth models Commonwealth Governance Handbook 2014/15 100 The Commonwealth Secretariat provides critical tools to member states in combating cyber vulnerabilities, including the Commonwealth Model Law on Computer and Computer- Related Crime (the Model Law) together with the recently revised Harare Scheme on mutual legal co-operation and the Commonwealth Network of Connected Persons (CNCP). The Model Law was adopted in 2002 and aims to ensure a high degree of convergence with the Budapest Convention. The law provides the guidance on key legal definitions, offences and procedural law. The Expert Report notes that 22 other Commonwealth countries made use of either the Budapest Convention or the Model Law, illustrating that the Model Law provides a flexible alternative to the Budapest Convention regime. The two systems are wholly compatible save in so far as the Model Law does not deal with mutual legal assistance. The longstanding Harare Scheme was amended in 2011 to accommodate the challenges posed by electronic evidence and evidence gathering. The revision of the Harare Scheme introduced material on taking evidence or statements through live video link or other audiovisual means; the interception of telecommunications; the interception of transmission data; the disclosure of intercepted material; surveillance; and the provision of subscriber information. Once again, the new provisions of the Harare Scheme closely resemble those of the Budapest Convention (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2014: p. 29). Finally, the CNCP serves the complimentary purpose of identifying the key contact persons for requests for mutual legal assistance. Beyond these general forms of assistance, the Secretariat also assists with specific requests. For example, the Expert Report, as endorsed by Commonwealth Law Ministers, included the specific recommendation that ‘each member state develops and maintains an effective national strategy to co-ordinate efforts to prevent and combat cybercrime’. To this end, in 2014 the Secretariat participated, at the request of the Government of Jamaica and OAS, in efforts to develop such a strategy in Jamaica through advising on models of best practice and attending national validation exercises with key stakeholders. This model of bilateral support mirrors other capacity-building exercises, such as the training of judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials. While these efforts deal with emergent problems and developments in the field of cybercrime, they build upon the deep foundations of the Secretariat’s historic role in providing direct assistance to member states in the form of model laws, legislative schemes and capacity-building exercises.


CEP template 2012
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