E x c e l l e n c e i n p u b l i c s e r v i c e : D e l i v e r y a n d r e f o rm Governors have also agreed to work with MCAs to set ‘budget ceilings of county assemblies in consultation with the county executive and not parliament’ (CoG, 2014). The political calculus of this co-operation between the governors and MCAs must not be lost in this fight over resource control. Both have close proximity to the voters, given that they are county-based – unlike MPs and senators, who are based in Nairobi and are perceived as agents of the national government. While governors have unrivaled access and control over the county-share of devolved resources, MCAs enjoy the tyranny of numbers. To enhance the political clout of MCAs, governors have proposed that MCAs should ‘enjoy the same privileges as those of MPs in a proportionate manner’ (Ndonga, 2014). The intention of governors in this case is not only to dilute the prestige enjoyed by MPs but also to gain support from MCAs in their quest for more resources from the national government. The combined onslaught by governors and MCAs on either a senator or an MP has serious political repercussions on the former at the local level. In cases where this has happened, like in the county of Nakuru, both the senator and MPs have either denied fighting the governor and the MCAs, or have openly apologised and pledged to ‘abandon confrontational politics’. While these fiscal turf wars may appear to be political wars among different actors over devolved resources at the local level, in a broader perspective they influence and shape the fiscal relations between the two levels of government. Conclusion The confrontational fiscal relations in Kenya’s devolved system, between the national and county governments and the attendant actors, is not a unique feature under the fiscal decentralisation process, especially given the ‘big bang’ manner in which Kenya undertook devolution. At the outset, the emerging picture of fiscal relations in Kenya is that, while constitutional and legal designs of a fiscal structure matter, so do the political and power interests of individual actors involved. Consequently, the resulting fiscal relations between or among different levels of government are shaped and influenced by these actors’ interests. As the discussion over unfunded mandates reveals, the pressure to provide ‘pork’ comes from both the individual actors and the two levels of government. The reluctance of the national government to fully transfer functions, and fund those functions already transferred constitutionally under schedule four of the constitution, which are equally partially funded by the MPs, evokes the ‘norm of reciprocity’ (Rubin, 2006). This means that the president is reluctant to limit the MPs’ avenue to provide ‘pork’ lest the national government’s own revenues be cut. Resolving the problem related to unfunded mandates at county level will therefore take some time. Going forward, there is hope that different actors from the two levels of government will co-operate to enhance fiscal relations for better service delivery to the citizens. Already there are signs of cooperation between governors and MCAs in confronting issues of common interest and this too is the case between the senators and MPs. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that, in some counties, governors, senators and MPs have come together to forge a common development agenda on local development. It is hoped that the current confrontational fiscal relations will soon transform into co-operative fiscal relations. Endnotes 1 The main reason for this dispute is that the last audited accounts are five years old and thus the annual allocations are not based on the previous year’s approved budget, as the county actors would wish. 2 The Council of Governors has filed a case in court to challenge the senatorial powers that require governors to appear before the Senate. 3 MPs have used the CDF to fund capital projects in health, roads, water, schools, bursaries and agriculture at the subcounty level. Although the CDF is recognised in law as part of devolved funds to the county governments, MPs have had a tight grip on its use since it was established in 2003 – ten years before the county governments were established. Full devolution of the mentioned functions and the attendant funding will therefore be somewhat of an advantage to governors at the expense of MPs. 4 The enactment of this amendment into law was viewed by some governors as an attempt by parliament to settle personal scores and by others as part of the scheme by the House of Parliament to pass some bills that revert back already devolved functions such as water, health and roads. 5 In total there are 1,450 elected MCAs in Kenya and about 480 nominated MCAs, compared to 290 elected MPs, 47 elected senators and 47 elected governors. References CoB (Office of the Controller of Budget), 2014. Annual Budget Implementation Report FY 2013/2014 pdf CoB. Available at: www.cob.go.ke/index.php/virtual-downloads/category/1- reports?download=96:budget-implement1-annual Accessed 13 January 2015. CoG (The Council of Governors), 2014. Statement of the Joint Consultative Meeting of the Leadership of Devolved Government in Kenya webpage CoG. Available at: http://cog.go.ke/index. php/faqs/news/49-statement-of-the-joint-consultative-meeting-ofthe leadership-of-devolved-government-in-kenya Accessed 13 January 2014. CRA (Commission for Revenue Allocation), no date. Devolve Funds from Central Government webpage CRA. Available at: www.crakenya.org/news/devolve-funds-from-central-government/ Accessed 13 January 2015. Commonwealth Governance Handbook 2014/15 62 MPs can adjust and approve ministerial allocations for services such as health care Rebecca Nduku
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