D emo c r a t i c a c c o u n t a b i l i t y a n d s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y Box 3: Answerability Box 4: Responsiveness Commonwealth Governance Handbook 2013/14 57 provision from government officials in charge of specific sectors (health, water and sanitation), sometimes even bypassing elected bodies such as national legislatures or city councils. Rather than imposing formal sanctions on politicians, citizens’ mobilisations can impose a heavy reputational cost on government officials should they fail to answer to citizens’ demands. An important point of contrast is that SA mechanisms are not legally binding in a direct way. Thus, such groups are not very different from other lobbying groups described by theories of democratic pluralism. On the other hand, these groups – although narrow in their policy demands – offer an appeal to ‘moral standpoints’ and therefore seek to institutionalise durable societal control over policies by exercising voice in deliberative processes that monitor public decisions (Joshi, 2008). In our case studies, we found that effective democratic accountability is the combined result of social mobilisation demands that take place in the context of well-defined and formal accountability mechanisms. This intersection between social and political accountability mechanisms is key to understanding and enhancing the potential impact of democracy on service provision. The existence of political accountability mechanisms, such as elections, and an independent legislature and judiciary, as well as other mechanisms for control and oversight, give citizens legal and formal opportunities to penalise or reward the performance of their elected representatives. Yet, political accountability mechanisms per se are not sufficient to meet the specific demands and needs of citizens. Nor do they offer the best channels for demanding immediate action from service providers. This is precisely the point at which social accountability mechanisms come into play to complement, enhance and advance the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms. SA mechanisms, such as social audits, usually require considerable effort to organise from outside the political system. In some instances, SA initiatives can rely on existing legal instruments, such as a ‘right to information’ act, to enhance their impact. Without the intervention of dedicated stakeholders, however, there are no formal means to ensure sustained and transparent government responses in the long run. Box 2: Transparency India is a case where the successful adoption of transparency enabling legislation in a highly democratic context effectively helped to improve democratic accountability. The adoption in 2005 of a Right to Information Act (RTIA) provided grass-roots campaigners with the impetus they needed to stimulate collective action around the effective application of a Public (food) Distribution System (PDS). Using government records obtained through the RTIA, social organisations were able to examine the actual transfers of food against the provision of food subsidies under the PDS scheme to demonstrate that some shop owners, in collusion with corrupt local officials, engaged in fraudulent activities and the mismanagement of funds. These grass-roots organisations used social/public audit mechanisms to disseminate information that had previously been considered exclusive to public assemblies. Thus, campaigners built an effective social movement that triggered effective responses from government officials to punish corrupt officials and restore the fairness of distribution chains (Pande, 2008). A positive example of answerability is found in South Africa, where social collective action through CSOs proved an effective way of improving government responses to the implementation of the Child Support Grant programme. Research conducted by IDASA, a local NGO, showed that sufficient state revenues had not been allocated to fund this essential social programme, thereby producing adverse and discriminatory effects on rural and less developed communities. Part of the problem was the lack of administrative capacity on the part of local governments to provide effective access to the state’s Child Support Grant programme. Through concerted social advocacy, CSOs lobbied to incorporate many of the key recommendations made in IDASA’s report into the 2003/04 budget. This example shows how collective action efforts crystallised into effective government answers to citizens’ demands (Hofbauer, 2006). The case of Uganda illustrates the use of informal means to ensure government responsiveness. Many district dialogues lead to revelations of petty corruption in which the perpetrator is made to reimburse the cost of or replace any items stolen or illegally procured. In one case, a district health official was initially reluctant to provide any information to the monitoring committee on funds received and his disbursement plans. After repeated attempts, the issue was brought to a full meeting between district officials, including the chief administrative officer, and civil society representatives. The health official reacted strongly, questioning the committee’s legitimacy to ask such questions and demand information. His behaviour was publicly condemned by most people present and after a reprimand from the chief administrative officer he began to collaborate with the committee (de Renzio et al., 2006).
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