Hofbauer, H., ‘Sustained Work and Dedicated Capacity: IDASA’s Experience in Applied Budget Work in South Africa’, Lessons from Civil Society Budget Analysis and Advocacy Initiatives (Washington, D.C.: International Budget Project, 2006). Joshi, Anuradha, ‘Producing Social Accountability: The Impact of Service Delivery Reforms’, IDS Bulletin 38/6 (2008). Kiewiet, D.R. and McCubbins, M., The Logic of Delegation (Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press, 1991). McCubbins, M. and Schwartz, T., ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms’, American Journal of Political Science 28 (1984), pp. 16–79. Mejia Acosta, A., Pilot Programme to Strengthen Parliamentary Oversight of the Extractive Sector in Ghana and Tanzania: Baselines Overview and M&E Report (London: Revenue Watch Institute, 2009). Mejia Acosta, A., ‘Do legislatures – and legislators – matter for poverty reduction?’, Peru Country Report, (Lima: International IDEA, 2008). Mejia, Acosta, A., Pérez-Liñán, A. and Saiegh, S., ‘The Partisan Foundations of Legislative Particularism in Latin America’, Mimeo. Social Science Research Network. Uploaded October 2007, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1018099>. Morgenstern, S., Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll Call Voting in the United States and Latin America’s Southern Cone (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004). O’Donnell, G., ‘Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies’, Journal of Democracy 9/3 (1998), pp. 112–126. Pande, S., ‘The Rights to Information and Societal Accountability: The Case of the Delhi PDS Campaign’, in Houtzager, P., Joshi, A. and Gurza Lavalle, A. (eds) State Reform and Social Accountability: Brazil, India and Mexico, IDS Bulletin 38/6 (January 2008). Payne, M., Zovatto, D., Carillo Flores, F. and Allamand Zavala, A. Democracies in Development. Politics and Reform in Latin America. Inter American Development Bank and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Washington, DC, 2002. Endnotes 1 The first dimension refers to the existence of clearly defined rules of the game for holding governments to account. To assess existing accountability standards, it is relevant to examine: (a) the extent to which existing legal provisions and prerogatives enable citizens to hold governments to account; (b) how responsibilities are defined; (c) whether there are legal provisions to ensure the dissemination of timely and transparent government information; (d) whether constitutions guarantee the political and civil freedoms of citizens; and (e) whether there are provisions to penalise government ineffectiveness. 2 The idea of answerability gauges the extent to which accountability relationships are truly reciprocal between clearly defined actors, in a way in which such actors have an understanding of who is answerable to whom. Answerable in this sense requires agents not only to provide timely information regarding decisions but also to be able to justify those decisions. D emo c r a t i c a c c o u n t a b i l i t y a n d s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y 3 The idea of responsiveness is that government officials must be effectively willing and/or able to respond to citizens’ demands given the available technical resources, economic constraints and the political context in which they interact. Some of the critical factors shaping government officials’ willingness to be accountable are linked to whether government officials are elected or appointed, how they are selected or nominated, and how are they elected, how often and whether they face term limits, and so on. 4 The fourth dimension, enforceability, considers the range of effective sanctions that can contribute to improving relations of democratic accountability. This dimension acknowledges that in some cases, effective democratic accountability may not occur even when there are legal provisions, widespread demand and favourable political support to hold governments to account. In some cases, lack of enforceability is observed when the government directly appoints those in control of oversight institutions, or the government restricts their financial autonomy. These encroachments on institutional autonomy can undermine the workings of proactive actors and undermine the workings of formal institutions of accountability. Commonwealth Governance Handbook 2013/14 59 Dr Andrés Mejía Acosta is a senior lecturer in political economy of emerging economies at the International Development Institute, King's College London. Previously at the Institute of Development Studies (Sussex, UK), he has been involved in research into natural resource revenues and development goals, and a comparative study ‘Analysing Nutrition Governance’, funded by UKAid, which looks at nutrition rates and government nutrition programmes in Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Zambia and other lowand middle-income countries. He has also consulted for a number of bodies (besides International IDEA), including: DFID, Club de Madrid, the Carter Center, Eurasia Group, Freedom House, UNDP and IADB. He has been co-convenor of the Research Programme on Revenue Collection and State Capacity for the Centre for the Future State. Dr Anuradha Joshi is a social scientist with a focus on policy processes and extensive experience in institutional analysis of development. She has worked on issues related to poverty, low-income housing, public services and environmental policy, and is also interested in taxation of the informal sector. She has experience in consulting for bilateral and multilateral agencies in development and managing large, multi-country research projects and has travelled and researched in India, Indonesia, Nepal, Vietnam and Ghana. Graeme Ramshaw obtained a PhD in development studies from the Institute of Development Studies (UK). His interests include democracy and state capacity, and his regional focus is Sub-Saharan Africa.
CGH13_ebook
To see the actual publication please follow the link above