D emo c r a c y a n d t h e r u l e o f l aw 54 per cent of voters in the November 2009 referendum voted against a reformed constitution; in other words, the 66.7 per cent threshold required to make the proposed changes to the constitution was not satisfied. In hindsight, it can be argued that the process in SVG merely exposed some of the underlying challenges inherent in the quest for autochthonous constitutions in the wider Commonwealth Caribbean. A review of the 2009 constitutional reform process in the context of SVG appears to suggest that among the main forces that fuelled the overwhelming rejection of the proposed revised constitution were: • A basic lack of understanding on the part of a large majority of Vincentians as to the import and implications of the proposed amendments • The complexity of the document which, although distributed to some 30,000 households, did not make for easy reading • The partisan political polarisation that was engendered by ‘yes’ and ‘no’ campaigns Moreover, a number of theoretical concerns also impeded what should have been a pivotal moment in SVG’s constitutional history. Firstly, there was no place in the Constitutional Reform Bill for the previously proposed National Advisory Council of Elders (NACE), which was due to be comprised of former heads of state, former heads of government and former judges from the St Vincent High Court, Court of Appeal and Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), and was proposed to perform several important functions, including providing the list of potential presidential appointees and advising on bureaucratic appointments. Secondly, unlike previous recommendations which attempted to limit (to two) the number of terms of office for prime ministers, the bill countenanced the preexisting position that prime ministers should be allowed to serve an unlimited number of terms. Finally, the bill, for the most part, maintained the controversial firstpast the-post system, which had proven in the past to be an avenue for heightened adversarial relations between political parties and was considered by some to be unfair or anachronistic. In short, as Matthew Louis Bishop aptly points out, with reference to the previous points it can be argued that although the Constitutional Reform Bill of SVG promised to improve the country’s governance through a variety of means, it was nevertheless ‘insufficient to alter radically the country’s politics in such a way as to genuinely transcend the limitations of Westminsterism’ (Bishop, 2011). Jamaica Unlike SVG, which ambitiously attempted to secure a two-thirds majority at the polls in a referendum to revise the entire constitution, Jamaica, after a 20-year constitutional reform exercise, introduced a limited revision to its 1962 Constitution in the form of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The charter, which ascertained royal assent in 2011, sought to redefine and, in some instances, reaffirm the rights and obligations between the state and the Jamaican citizenry and, more controversially, in respect of relations between citizens. In relation to the latter point, perhaps the most far-reaching amendment brought about by the charter is provision, for the first time in the context of Commonwealth Caribbean constitutional law, for the horizontal application of human rights in a similar vein to the South African Constitution. In other words, not only does the charter envisage claims for redress on constitutional grounds brought by citizens against public bodies, but also claims between citizens aggrieved by the unlawful conduct of other citizens that infringes upon their constitutional rights as enshrined by the charter, and in relation to which there are no other alternative means of redress available. While this development is recent and its implications not yet understood, initial suggestions are that the Jamaican courts may, in fact, be prepared to take a limited and even rigid approach to construing the principle of the horizontal application of rights. Arguably, this would not take proper account of the context and intent surrounding the principle of the horizontal application of human rights (Wheatle, 2013). On the other hand, as argued by Derek O’Brien and Se-Shauna Wheatle, the charter can, in some respects, be viewed as socially conservative, particularly regarding its approach to the controversial issues of the death penalty and criminalising of homosexuality and abortion (O’Brien and Wheatle, 2012). Furthermore, the fact that the charter does not place any real limitation on the extensive powers of the executive is also a sour point for a growing number of commentators. That said, some commentators remain cautiously optimistic that the charter has introduced some progressive features. For example, it increases the number and extent to which certain rights are protected; extends the locus standi requirement to accommodate a potentially greater number of litigants; and removes the immunity from constitutional challenges of acts of parliament that have achieved a special majority. Notwithstanding the aforementioned difficulties, however, the Jamaican charter ultimately received royal assent and is now fully operational. Trinidad and Tobago The Constitutional Reform Commission (CRC) of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago was established on 2 March 2013 with the objective of consulting the general populace about the feasibility of constitutional reform. In its report, published in December 2013, the CRC proposed four controversial amendments to the 1976 Constitution that were ultimately included in the Commonwealth Governance Handbook 2014/15 22 Trinidad and Tobago: as of 2014, candidates must get at least 50 per cent (plus one) of votes cast
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